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Abstract
The risk of political predation impedes the achievement of economic prosperity. In this paper, we analyze
how the risk of predation evolves in diﬀerent political regimes. Formally, we look at the interaction between
ag o v e r n m e n ta n dc i t i z e n si nw h i c h ,i ne a c hp e r i o d ,t h eg o v e r n m e n th a sa no p t i o nt op r e d a t e .C i t i z e n sp r e f e r
governments that are competent and non-predatory and strive to replace ones that are not. Regimes diﬀer in the
degree to which citizens can succeed in doing so. In pure democracies, citizens can displace incumbent govern-
ments; in pure autocracies, they cannot; and in intermediate cases, they can do so in probability. After economic
downturns, the posterior probability that the government is competent and benevolent declines. According to
the model, in intermediate regimes, but not in others, governments can separate by type. One implication, then,
is that these regimes are politically and economically more volatile, with higher levels of variation in assessments
of political risk and in economic performance. Another is that in such regimes, political leadership can make an
economic diﬀerence. Empirically, we test our argument by measuring the impact of economic downturns on the
perceived risk of political expropriation in diﬀerent regime types, using as instruments the incidence of natural
disasters and unexpected terms of trade shocks.
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The "Third Wave" refers to the process of democratization that began with the transition from authoritar-
ian rule in Iberia, culminated in the fall of the Soviet Union, and inspired political reform in late-century
Africa (Huntington 1991). As noted by Geddes (2003), what resulted was not the creation of democracies;
it was the creation of intermediate or mixed regimes. As shown in Figure 1, in the mid-1970’s, these
regimes prevailed in less than 4% of the world’s states; by the year 2000, they prevailed in more than one
quarter.
The behavior of intermediate regimes appears erratic. Focusing on political outcomes, Goldstone,
Marshall et al. (2003), Hegre (2004) and Gates, Hegre et al. (2001) demonstrate that they are less stable
politically than are full democracies or autocracies (see also Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Kenyon and Naoi
(2010) ﬁnd that policy uncertainty is also greater in such regimes. And Epstein et al. (2006) conclude
that while, pace (Przeworski, Alvarez et al. 2000), a variety of modernization variables, including per
capita income, systematically relate to the transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes, none
bears a systematic relationship to transitions into or out of the category of intermediate regimes. Epstein
et al. (2006) therefore appear to be speaking for the generation of scholars who ﬁrst addressed this new
category of political system when they write: "These are ’fragile’ democracies, or perhaps ’unconsolidated
democracies.’ Whatever one wishes to call them, they emerge .. as [m]ore volatile than either straight
autocracies or democracies. Their [behavior] seems at the moment to be largely unpredictable" (p. 24).
Common sense and economic reasoning (North and Weingast 1989; Acemoglu et al. 2003) posit a
relationship between political restraint and economic performance. When those who possess capital face
the prospect of conﬁscation, they will refrain from investing; and entrepreneurs will be more willing to
innovate when they stand to reap the fruits of their labor. On the basis of such reasoning, scholars
expected to ﬁnd that democracies would achieve higher growth rates than did authoritarian regimes.
However, they do not. As documented by Boix and Svolik (2008), Haber (2006), Haber et al. (2006)
1and Gelbach and Keefer (2008 2009), some authoritarian regimes appear to be able credibly to signal
political restraint and to attract capital. As a result, their economic performance approximates that
of democracies.1 As scholars have probed the structure of non-democratic regimes, they have noted
the existence of institutional checks, such as legislatures, opposition parties, and elections (Gandhi 2008,
Gandhi and Przeworski 2006 and 2007, Cox 2009, Collier and Levitsky 1997, Levitsky and Way 2002,
Magaloni 2006 and others, such as Boix and Svolik 2008 Pop-Eliches and Robinson 2009, Henisz 2000, and
Henisz and Williamson 1999). Given a relationship between political restraint and economic performance,
and given the institutional heterogeneity of autocracies, it is therefore not surprising that the economies
of some outperform those of the democracies . For, as noted by Besley and Kudamatsu (2008), while the
mean rate of growth among autocracies may have been lower than that for democracies, "the distribution
has fatter tails ...." (p. 453, see also Przeworski et al. (2000)).
This article represents an attempt to model the major characteristics of intermediate regimes so as
to account for their political behavior and their economic performance. While we are unable to test our
model directly, we do exploit one of its basic implications: that under well-speciﬁed conditions, economic
performance can be politically informative. In particular, the model implies that at intermediate levels of
political restraint, assessments of political risk should vary with the state of the economy and therefore
alter subsequent outcomes.
To test this implication, we use panel country data. In contrast to Ramey and Ramey (1995), who
analyze the relationship between economic volatility and average growth rates, we focus on the relationship
between economic and political volatility and the manner in which it varies among regimes. We use
measures of country risk, such as "expropriation risk" (Knack and Keefer 1998) that oﬀer proxy for the
risk of predation. To identify the eﬀect of economic downturns, we instrument them with an incidence
1See also the literature on weak institutions, e.g. Acemoglu et al. (2004), Padro i Miguel (2007), and Bueno de Mesquita
et al. (2003), and on the political origins of economic instability, i.e. Acemoglu et al. (2003), Rodrik (2000), Cuberes and
Jerzmanowski (2009).
2of natural disasters and unexpected terms-of-trade shocks. To deal with unobserved heterogeneity, we
control for country ﬁxed eﬀects. To ensure that the exclusion restriction is satisﬁed, we take lags of all
the controls, so that all the variables except instrumented shock are observed prior to disasters or shocks.
To the extent that natural disasters in the future cannot aﬀect control variables today, the exclusion
restriction holds. As one can argue that unexpected terms of trade shocks could still be endogenous,
we show that there are no overidentifying restrictions under the assumption that natural disasters are
exogenous. In the end, we ﬁnd that, indeed, the risk of predation increases after growth downturns, and
that this eﬀect is the strongest in intermediate regimes.
Informal Argument
The polity is populated by citizens and their government. The government derives utility from being in
oﬃce and the beneﬁts of political predation.2 The citizens derive utility from an outcome, y, which we
interpret as economic growth. At the end of each period, citizens can seek to replace the government.
They succeed with some probability, which depends on the nature of political institutions.
Governments diﬀer in their type. Some are competent: even if they enjoy private beneﬁts, they do not
always harm their citizens and, upon occasion, deliver positive policy outcomes. Others are incompetent:
they are incapable of doing good for their citizens in most instances, and, upon occasion, they do them
harm.
The behavior of the rulers depends upon their type and the incentives generated by the power of the
citizens, i.e. their ability to change their government. If the citizens can easily dismiss the government,
as in a consolidated democracy, both competent and incompetent governments will choose to refrain from
2By predatory policies we mean the policies that may be proﬁtable for the government but harmful for the the long run
welfare of citizens. Expropriation can be blatant, as in the case of Zimbabwe, where the government seized the land of
farmers, the assets of ﬁrms, and the foreign exchange deposited with banks. Or it can be more subtle, resulting from the
manipulation of the interest and exchange rates or inﬂation.
3predation. If it is diﬃcult for the citizens to do so, as in full autocracies, both competent and incompetent
governments will adopt policies that maximize their per-period rents. The level of political constraint that
makes a government indiﬀerent between predation and restraint is higher for the competent government.
Under intermediate level of constraints, then, competent governments will refrain from predation while
incompetent governments may not. Therefore, in intermediate regimes governments with diﬀerent values
"separate,"thus revealing their type and generating a dispersion in the levels of investment and growth
rates.
As diﬀerent types of governments behave diﬀerently only in intermediate regimes, there should there-
fore be a higher variation of risk within them than within full democracies or autocracies. Moreover,
in such countries, under imperfect information, the risk of predation should respond more signiﬁcantly
to economic shocks, as people treat them as signals of the nature of their government. By our model,
then, there should be a higher variation of both cross-sectional variation and time-series volatility in
intermediate regimes than in full democracies or autocracies.
2 The Model
The Government
The government might be competent or incompetent. It can predate and consume rents, but also
generates an outcome y for the citizens. Hereafter we assume that such an outcome takes the form of
economic growth, but other interpretations are possible.
The government receives utility B from being in oﬃce, a rent R if engaged in predation, and cares
about future periods.
Treating the competence of the government, θ ∈ {θH,θL}, and the incidence of predation, x ∈ {0,1},
as binary, we associate the likelihood of a positive outcome with its type and its decision to engage in
predation:
4Pr(y =1 |θ = θH,x= 0) = 1
Pr(y =1 |θ = θH,x= 1) = pH
Pr(y =1 |θ = θL,x= 0) = pL
Pr(y =1 |θ = θL,x= 1) = 0
(1)
If not engaged in predation, the government’s per-period utility is B; if so engaged, its per-period
utility is B + R . A government cares about future rents and discounts the future with factor δ.3 After
the government is dismissed, its per-period utility is 0 thereafter.
The utility of a competent government is Vt = B + δ Pr(stays|yt = 1)Vt+1 if it does not predate
and Vt = B + R + δ (pH Pr(stays|yt = 1)Vt+1 +( 1− pH)Pr(stays|yt = 0)Vt+1) if it engages in predation
(where stays means remains in power). The comparable values for an incompetent government are Vt =
B +δ(pL Pr(stays|yt = 1)Vt+1 +(1−pL)Pr(stays|yt = 0)Vt+1) and Vt = B +R+δ Pr(stays|yt = 0)Vt+1,
respectively. The ex-ante probability of a competent government is µ.
Citizenry
The citizens receive utility from y. Their per-period utility function is f(y). The discounted long-term
utility of citizens is given by Ut = f(y)+δUt+1 if citizens do not try to overthrow the current government
and by Ut = f(y) − c(γ)+δ (γU∗ +( 1− γ)Ut+1) if they do. Here U∗ is the expected utility from a
new government drawn from the distribution of new governments, while Ut+1 is the expected utility from
retaining the current government. The term c(γ) represents the costs of attempting to overthrow the
current government. The discount factor for the citizens is the same as for the government.
Citizens might try to replace the government if they are not satisﬁed with its performance. If they want
to do so – as, for example, if they estimate the competence of an old government, ￿ µt,t ob es u b s t a n t i a l l y
smaller than the estimated competence of a new one, µ, – they succeed with probability γ. The variable γ
3It is possible to extend the model to allow the government to spend some beneﬁts from predation on repression in order
to prevent being overthrown, as in Besley and Persson (2011). In order to keep the model as simple as possible., we do not
do so.
5thus captures the level of constraint faced by a government when making decisions: it can be interpreted
as the probability that citizens succeed should they seek to overturn the government. If performance of
the economy is poor, the citizens may attempt to replace the current government. If they succeed, the
next government is competent (i.e. θH) with the same ex-ante probability µ. As a result, in the model
the likelihood of a ruler being replaced is exogenous conditional on citizen’s willingness to overthrow the
government, which is a dichotomous function of the gap in perceived competence.
Risk of predation
The risk of predation is the probability that the government is going to predate in any given time
period. Formally, rt denotes Pr(xt =1 |yt−1, ￿ µt),t h ep r o b a b i l i t yo fx =1in period t, given the history of
observed events.
Timing
For simplicity, we consider a 3-period model. The structure of the game is common knowledge; in the
last period, both the government and the people realize that the game is about to end.
In each period, the timing is:
1. The current government decides whether or not to predate and chooses x ∈ {0,1}.
2. The outcome variable y is realized, with probabilities which depend on the government’s decision
to predate and the government’s competence, as described in (1).
3. Citizens observe the outcome variable y and decide whether to challenge the government; they
succeed in overturning it with probability γ.
4. All agents get their per-period payoﬀs. Risk variables for the next period are calculated.
5. If in stage 3 people succeeded in overthrowing the government, the new government is drawn from
the distribution of potential governments.
62.1 Solution
The game is solved by backward induction. First, we consider what happens at t =3 , then we look at
t =2and solve the continuation game between the people and the government given citizens’ beliefs.
Finally, we assign the continuation payoﬀs to all nodes in which the continuation game could start and
solve the game at t =1 . The solution forms a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
In period t =3 :
All types of government choose to predate. As there is no next period, citizens do not overthrow the
government because of the positive costs c(γ).
In period t =2:
Citizens know that the government is going to predate in period 3. As they prefer to have a competent
government, but face the costs if try to overthrow the current one, they replace the current government
whenever their posterior probability that the government is competent is less than some constant µ∗(γ)
which is strictly less than the prior probability that the next government will be competent and depends
on c(γ), i.e. if ￿ Pr(θH) <µ ∗(γ).
In the beginning of the period, the government can anticipate the strategy that the citizens will
choose. A government wants to extract rents but also to stay in power. At this point, the continu-
ation value of staying in power is V3 = B + R for both governments that are competent and those
that are not. A competent government compares B + δ Pr(stays in office|y = 1)[B + R] with B +
R+δ (pH Pr(stays|y = 1)[B + R]+( 1− pH)Pr(stays|y = 0)[B + R]). An incompetent government com-
pares B + δ (pL Pr(stays|y = 1)[B + R]+( 1− pL)Pr(stays|y = 0)[B + R])with B + R + δ Pr(stays|y =
0)[B + R].
To ﬁnd the optimal behavior of a government, it is necessary to make assumptions about the peoples’
strategy conditional on the realization of y, and to check if these assumptions make sense, i.e. they are
rational given citizens’ beliefs. Note that the citizens will wish to replace the government in some states of
the world if the costs c(γ) are small enough (e.g. if they believe that the probability of a low-competence
7government is greater than 0), as otherwise governments of all types will choose to misbehave. As replacing
the government is not very costly for the citizens, such a strategy weakly dominates the strategy of doing
nothing.
The next lemma describes an equilibrium in a continuation game.4 Denote by xij the decision of the
government of type i to predate in period j, and denote as yj the policy outcome in period j. Denote
also the people’s strategy in period 2 as s2|y2 ∈ {overthrow, not overthrow}.
Lemma 1 If c(γ) is small enough then at t =2 ,t h e r ei sa ne q u i l i b r i u mi nac o n t i n u a t i o ng a m ei nw h i c h :
1. For R>δ(B+R)(1−pH)γ, equilibrium strategies are xH2 =1 , xL2 =1 ,a n ds2|1=not overthrow,
s2|0=overthrow;
2. If δ(B + R)pLγ <R<δ(B + R)(1 − pH)γ, equilibrium strategies are xH2 =0 , xL2 =1 ,a n d
s2|1=not overthrow, s2|0=overthrow;
3. If δ(B + R)pLγ >R ,equilibrium strategies are xH2 =0 , xL2 =0 ,a n ds2|1=not overthrow,
s2|0=overthrow.
Proof. In Appendix.
Here, the equilibrium strategy of people is simple: if they observe y2 =0 , they overthrow the gov-
ernment; otherwise, they do not. If y2 =1 , the posterior probability that the government is of type H
increases, as compared with µ, the probability that a new government will be of that type. By contrast,
when y2 =0 , then that probability declines. The optimal strategy of the government depends on γ.F o r
low γ, all types of government predate; for intermediate values of γ, only governments of low competence
predate; while for high values of γ, all types of government refrain from predation.
Denote people’s strategy in period 1 as s1|y1. The following proposition describes equilibria which
emerge in the original game for diﬀerent values of R and γ (see the summary in Table 1).
4All equilibria in a continuation game are characterized in a working paper version of this paper. To save space, we
refrain from presenting them here.
8Proposition 1 If R is suﬃciently large and c(γ) is suﬃciently small, the equilibrium set of strategies is
the following:
• xL1 =1 , xH1 =1 ,s 1|1=not overthrow, s1|0=overthrow if γ is suﬃciently small,
• xL1 =1 , xH1 =0 ,s 1|1=not overthrow, s1|0=overthrow if γ is suﬃciently large;
If both R and c(γ) are suﬃciently small, the equilibrium set of strategies is the following:
• xL1 =1 , xH1 =1 ,s 1|1=not overthrow, s1|0=overthrow if γ is suﬃciently small ,
• xL1 =1 , xH1 =0 ,s 1|1=not overthrow, s1|0=overthrow if γ is in intermediate range,
• xL1 =0 , xH1 =0 ,s 1|1=not overthrow, s1|0=overthrow if γ is suﬃciently large.
The corresponding equilibria in a continuation game are described in lemma 1.
Proof. In Appendix.
Clearly, institutions matter. For high values of γ, or, correspondingly, low values of R, all types of
government refrain from predation, and institutions perform their role of restricting the behavior of the
government. For intermediate values of γ and R, only governments with high competence refrain from
predation, while governments with low competence predate. For small values of γ, or high values of R,
all types of government predate, and accountability mechanisms are ineﬀective.
2.2 Empirical implications
The model thus generates a relationship between political risk, economic performance and regime type.
Among democracies, we see political restraint and favorable prospects for investment and growth. In
unconstrained dictatorships, we witness political predation and few prospects for investment and growth.
And among intermediate regimes, we ﬁnd heterogeneity, both political and economic.
9As we cannot observe the strategies and expectations of the actors, it is diﬃcult to devise direct tests
of the model. The logic of the model implies, however, changes in the level of measurable risk that must
prevail if the model is correct.
Consider the risk of predation in the second period, given by Pr(x2 =1 |y1 = i,￿ µ1), i ∈ {0,1}. Then if
the government is not replaced, two propositions follow. These propositions oﬀer opportunities for testing
the model.
Proposition 2 After period 1,t h er i s ko fp r e d a t i o n ,a sp e r c e i v e db yt h ec i t i z e n s ,g o e su pa f t e ro b s e r v i n g
y1 =0 ,i . e .Pr(x1 = 1) ≤ ￿ Pr(x2 =1 |y1 = 0).
Proof. In Appendix.
Basically, this proposition implies that a growth downturn provides a signal of the government’s
(in)competence.
More telling, perhaps, is the second implication: that the magnitude of this eﬀect should be greatest
in intermediate regimes.
Proposition 3 The estimated risk of predation changes more signiﬁcantly after observing y =0at inter-
mediate values of γ.
Proof. In Appendix.
In intermediate regimes, there are incentives for the diﬀerent types of governments to separate in
equilibrium; as a result, growth downturns provide a clearer signal of a government’s type. We therefore
expect to ﬁnd economic performance more closely related to the citizen’s estimates of the risk of
predation in these regimes than in pure democracies or autocracies.
These predictions do not oﬀer a full test of the model, of course; but we should observe these patterns
of behavior if the model is correct.
103 Empirical Results
To test the model, we gathered data for 123 countries for the years 1982-2003; the depth of the panel
is dictated by the availability of measures of political risk. Using these data, we have identiﬁed a set
of growth downturns. We show that risk estimates increase after economic downturns. Observing their
relationship with measures of risk under diﬀerent regimes, we also show that the sensitivity of risk to
economic performance depends on the nature of political institutions. In particular, we ﬁnd that after
negative economic shocks, average changes in assessments of risk are greatest in "intermediate" regimes.
3.1 Dependent Variable
The data come from the IRIS-3 dataset constructed by Steve Knack and Philip Keefer for the Center for
Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS) at the University of Maryland. The dataset includes
scores for six political risk variables: corruption in government, rule of law, bureaucratic quality, ethnic
tensions, repudiation of contracts by government, and risk of expropriation. We employ the IRIS measure
of expropriation risk and the risk of the government’s repudiation of contracts. For ease of interpretation,
we transform the indices so that higher values imply higher levels of risk. The variables range from 0 to
10.5 Table 4 provides summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis.
3.2 Independent Variables
For our independent variables, we provide measures of γ, or the capacity of citizens to depose their
government; a dummy variable to signify economic downturns; and dummies for external economic shocks.
In addition, we introduce several control variables to capture time varying characteristics of diﬀerent
5In a previous version of this paper, we also employed data from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) itself. We
choose to withdraw these results, as their indices are based only on ovjective indicators and do not incorporate expectations.
The results for ICRG risk indices are consistent with the results we are presenting here and are available in a working paper
paper version of this paper.
11countries.6
Measures of Political Restraint:
We use the 21 point Polity scale as a proxy for γ. Less skewed than the democracy or autocracy scale, (see
ﬁgures 3-5), it enables us to gather our observations into three groups of roughly equal size: autocracies,
with Polity ≤− 7; democracies, with Polity ≥ 7; and intermediate regimes, with Polity scores in between.7
Such a division yields three groups of comparable: 1138 observations of autocracies, 911 observations of
intermediate regimes, and 1181 observations of democracies.
We also report the results with small changes in the endpoints for Polity.
As an alternative measure, we use a classiﬁcation based on Legislative Index of Electoral Competition
from the Database on Political Institutions of Beck et al. (2006). The advantage of this index is that we
can clearly explain what our cutoﬀs mean. The drawback is that the distribution of this index is skewed
to the right, and some results might appear/disappear mechanically, because of large diﬀerences in the
size of each regime group (see Fig. 6). Speciﬁcally, we use the following cutoﬀ points: 3 (legislature is
elected, but only closed list of candidates from one party is allowed) for being autocracy, and 7 (legislature
is elected, and the largest party received less than 75 percents of seats) for being a democracy.8
Economic Shocks:
To identify negative shocks, we employ the methodology used by Hausman et al. (2005). We create a
“ﬁlter” based on yearly growth diﬀerences: ∆git = git − gi,t−1, where git is a growth rate of country i
6Characteristics of countries which are constant over time are captured by country ﬁxed eﬀects.
7The main reason for using -7 and 7 as thresholds is to divide the sample into three approximately equal groups. We
thereby avoid the bias potentially induced by diﬀerences in group size.
8Beck et al. (2001) provide the following coding for their index: 1 - no legislature; 2 - unelected legislature; 3 - elected,
one candidate; 4 - one party, multiple candidates; 5 - multiple parties are legal, but only one won seats (because other parties
did not exist, compete, or win seats); 6 - multiple parties competes and won seats (but one party won 75 percent or more
of the seats); 7 - the largest party received less than 75 percent of the seats.
12during the time period t. We label a short term change in the growth rate a negative growth shock when
(1) in the year of shock ∆git < −2 ppa (percentage points of growth per annum).
(2) after a shock git < 2 ppa. This restriction prevents counting as a growth collapse a decline from,
say, 8 to 5 percent per year.
We then create the variable shockt,t−2 which is equal to 1 if a negative economic shock took place in
the years t, t − 1,o rt − 2, and which is equal to 0 otherwise.
Summary statistics appear in Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix. Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa
and the region of Australia and Oceania exhibit the greatest frequency of negative growth shocks, while
countries in Western Europe, North America and Asia exhibit the lowest. The average magnitudes of
negative changes in growth rates are shown in table 2. Countries in Western Europe and North America
have the lowest average magnitudes – the average decrease in their growth rates after a shock is 3.4
percentage points. Countries in Australasia and Oceania yield the largest, with an average decrease of
8.4 percentage points. The results are robust to small changes in the parameters of the ﬁlter.
Instrumental Variables:
Regressions of risk indicators on growth shocks are subject to endogeneity bias: an increase in political
risk can spur a growth decline. Because of the persistence in the risk variables, lags of the shock dummies
fail to address this problem. We therefore sought exogenous variables that could provide instruments
for negative economic shocks and chose the number of natural disasters and the onset of an unexpected
decline in the terms of trade .
Data about natural disasters come from Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) prepared by World
Health Organization Collaborating Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). The
relevant descriptive statistics appear in Table 3 of the Appendix. The variable "natural disaster" is equal
to the number of natural disasters that take place in a given country-year. It ranges from 0 to 12.
Data on unexpected terms of trade shocks are taken from the database composed by Dani Rodrik.
13He excluded the inﬂuence of long-term trends and some macroeconomic fundamentals from a country’s
current terms of trade, thereby capturing the“unexpected"part of terms of trade volatility. As do Hausman
et al. (2005), we construct a dummy variable which takes the value 1 when there is a negative unexpected
terms of trade shock that falls in the lowest quartile (25%) of the distribution and 0 otherwise.
Our empirical strategy can be questioned on the grounds that exogenous events are observable and
cannot themselves be attributed to the actions of governments. True, but the disaster itself stands apart
from the government’s response to it. And while the citizens may spare the government censure for the
ﬁrst, they are likely to form judgments about the government’s handling of the second. In addition, while
citizens may indeed observe the shock, they may be unable to judge whether its magnitude is suﬃcient
to account for a decline in the growth rate. True again, but the citizens are aware that all governments
presiding over a sluggish economy have an incentive to attribute poor economic performance to external
causes. Given this, citizens may change their assessment of the government’s type during bad times.
Therefore, there is no contradiction between our model and our empirical strategy.
Control Variables:
Given the literature on the relationship between income and democracy (Lipset 1960), we control for
the level of GDP per capita using data from the World Development Indicators (WDI). Smaller countries
would be more vulnerable to external terms of trade shocks, and vulnerability might decline as population
grows. Larger countries might also be more likely to experience natural disasters. In addition, recent
literature suggest that countries with larger population are more prone to revolutions (Campante and
Do, 2007) and have larger public sector (Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998). We therefore control for the
population size, using data from WDI. We also control for trade openness, using the ratio of exports
and imports together to country GDP. The data again come from WDI. To control for country’s time
invariant characteristics, we include country ﬁxed eﬀects. As Bates, Block and Tiefenthaler (1991) and
Rodrik (1998) illustrate, there is a correlation between exposure to economic volatility and the size of
14government, so we control for government expenditures as percentage of GDP, from WDI.
3.3 Preliminary observations
Our theoretical argument implies that risk is more responsive to economic performance in intermediate
regimes. It also implies that the evolution of risk in intermediate regimes diﬀers from that in other types
of governments. Taken together, the two implications suggest that intermediate regimes should exhibit
higher variance in assessments of risk than would stable democracies or autocracies.
The descriptive statistics suggest that it is the case. Figure 7 captures the variance of expropriation
risk by regime type. As can be seen, the middle group, corresponding to intermediate regimes, exhibits
the largest variance. By implication, then, the variance of growth rates in the sample should be greater
for intermediate regimes than for full democracies or full autocracies. Figure 8 lends support to this claim.
3.4 Statistical Tests
Proposition 2 predicts risk should increase after an economic shock. Bayes’ rule implies that the contem-
porary level of risk should depend on its previous value. We therefore estimate a model that includes
the lagged value of the dependent variable plus a dummy for economic downturns, control variables, and
country ﬁxed eﬀects.
riski,t+1 = β0 + β1riski,t−3 + β2shocki;t,t−2 + β3Xi,t−3 + ηi + εi,t+1 (2)
Because annual data on political risk are noisy, we use 3-year period averages. Shockt,t−2 is an
indicator variable that is equal 1 if a negative economic shock occurs in the interval t, t−1,o rt−2. Xt−3
is the vector of control variables, which are observed prior to economic shock (i.e. at t − 3).
As an economic decline, shocki;t,t−2 , may be the consequence of high risk at t − 3, there is the
potential for endogeneity bias. We therefore estimate (2) using a 2SLS procedure, in which shocki;t,t−2
is instrumented by nat_dst_3t– the number of natural disasters in years t, t − 1,a n dt − 2 – and terms
15of trade shocks tot_shock_3ki;t,t−2 by the number of unexpected term of trade shocks in this period.
By construction, the instruments are not correlated with either our control variables Xt−3, as they are
computed in the years preceding the shock, or with our measure of riskt−3. As we use a ﬁxed eﬀect
estimator of (2), the possibility of a correlation between our instruments and unobserved, country-speciﬁc
eﬀects does not arise. Note that any bias in ￿ β2 that may arise because of the autoregressive term in (2)
and the presence of country eﬀects will be negative. If such bias is present, then, it renders our results
stronger.9
To the extent that we believe that natural disasters and terms of trade shocks are exogenous, our
instruments are valid. We test the validity of our instruments by using the Hausman’s test of overiden-
tifying restrictions. The null hypothesis – that there are no overidentifying restrictions – implies that
instruments are not endogenous to each other. The results suggest that the null hypothesis can not be
rejected at 5% signiﬁcance level.
Proposition 3 implies that perceptions of risk should depend on the level of γ, the ability of citizens
to change their government. In particular, our theory predicts that the increase of risk after an economic
shock should be greatest in intermediate regimes.
By using interaction terms, we can combine the tests of the two hypotheses into one model:
riski,t+1 = β0 + β1riski,t−3 + β2shocki;t,t−2 ∗ di1,t−3 + β3shocki;t,t−2 ∗ di2,t−3 + (3)
+β4shocki;t,t−2 ∗ di3,t−3 + β5di1,t−3 + β5di2,t−3 + β6Xi,t−3 + ηi + εi,t+1
9Note that in this speciﬁcation, the ﬁrst diﬀerence estimator of (2) is not consistent (Bond 2002). We address the
possibility of endogeneity by instrumenting shocki;t,t−2,a n db yn o t i n gt h a tt h ec o r r e l a t i o no fl a g g e dd e p e n d e n tv a r i a b l e
with the error term is negative (see Nickel 1981 for a formal proof). Arellano-Bond (1991) and Blundell-Bond (1998) oﬀer
an alternative way of addressing this probelm and we applied them to estimate (2). We do not report the corresponding
GMM estimates as the corresponding regressor matrix is nearly singular, implying that small changes in assumed values of
the estimators would result in large changes in estimated coeﬃcients, and standard errors cannot be consistently estimated.
The signs of the coeﬃcients in GMM estimation and their signiﬁcance levels in some speciﬁcations are consistent with those
reported in the paper.
16where dummy variables dij,t−3 denote being in group j of political regimes at t−3 (group 1 is autocracies,
group 2 is intermediate regimes, and group 3 democracies). The coeﬃcients β2 through β4 provide
a measure of the diﬀerential impact of growth collapses among the three categories of regimes. The
interactions between shocki;t,t−2 and the dummies for political regime are instrumented by the interactions
between these dummies and natural disasters nat_dst_3t and terms of trade shocks tot_shock_3t.O u r
model takes dij,t−3 as given, so we do not seek instruments for this term. Proposition 3 implies that the
coeﬃcient β3 for the interaction with intermediate regime is positive and signiﬁcant, while coeﬃcients β2
and β4 should be 0.
3.5 Findings
Basic results
Table 5 shows the results of an estimation of model (2) that incorporates ﬁxed eﬀects and instrumental
variables. Columns 1-2 present the results of OLS estimation, while columns 3-4 report the results of IV
estimation. The dummy for a negative shock is the coeﬃcient of interest. By Proposition 2, the coeﬃcient
should be negative and signiﬁcant. We ﬁnd that the IV estimates are of the expected sign and signiﬁcant,
which lends support to our model. The OLS coeﬃcients are smaller than IV coeﬃcients, and neither is
signiﬁcant. According to the estimates, the impact of economic downturns on risk assessments is sizable,
being approximately 0.5-0.6 of a standard deviation for both measures.
Interactions
Table 6 reports estimates of model (3). For the IV speciﬁcations, the coeﬃcients for the interaction be-
tween economic shocks and regime type are signiﬁcant for intermediate regimes, while none are signiﬁcant
for the interactions with autocracy or democracy. Figure 9 illustrates the behavior of the corresponding
coeﬃcients for diﬀerent measures of risk. Again, the OLS coeﬃcient remain smaller than those for the IV
estimates and most are not signiﬁcant. By column (3), an economic downturn increases the risk of ex-
propriation in an intermediate regime by 2.98 risk points, equal to approximately 1.1 standard deviations
17of the dependent variable. Similarly, an economic downturn increases the risk of repudiation of contracts
by 1.85 risk points, which is approximately equal to 0.55 standard deviations of the dependent variable.
Both coeﬃcients are far larger than are those for autocracies or democracies. The data thus conﬁrm
that, as implied by our model, the level of perceived political risk increases after growth shocks and that
this eﬀect is signiﬁcantly more pronounced for intermediate regimes.
Alternative classiﬁcation of regimes
The results of Table 6 rely on Polity IV-based classiﬁcation of regimes into democracies, autocracies,
and intermediate regimes. Alternatively, we can use the classiﬁcation that relies on more intuitive insti-
tutional criteria based on the Database of Political Institutions of Beck et al. (2006). Table 7 reports
the results of this exercise. The IV coeﬃcients for the interaction of economic shocks with an interme-
diate regime are signiﬁcant at the 5% level for both dependent variables. By column (3), an economic
downturn increases the risk of expropriation in an intermediate regime by 3.99 risk points, which is equal
to 1.5 standard deviations of the dependent variable. Similarly, by column (4) an economic downturn
increases the risk of repudiation of contracts by 3.70 risk points, which is equal to 1.1 standard deviations
of dependent variable. Overall, the results of Table 7 are consistent with those of Table 6.
No government changes (main results)
Note that between t − 3 and t +1the government could change. Were that the case, the evidence
in Tables 5-7 would fail to provide a "clean" test of Propositions 2 and 3, and the coeﬃcients would be
subject to attenuation bias. In response to this possibility, we re-estimate equation (3) while restricting
our attention to countries in which the governments did not change between t−2 and t.10 The results are
presented in Table 8. Consistent with the possibility of attenuation bias, the IV coeﬃcients exhiibit larger
numerical values and higher levels of signiﬁcance (1%), despite being computed from smaller samples, as
compared with Table 6. The OLS coeﬃcients are still much smaller than those computed when using
instrumental variables. The IV coeﬃcients change to 3.10 risk points for expropriation risk (1.1 standard
10Risk variables are computed in the beginning of year t +1 ,s ow es h o u l dn o tc a r ea b o u ty e a rt +1 .
18deviations) and 2.58 risk points for the risk of repudiation of contracts (0.7 standard deviations). As
Table 8 provides a more accurate test of our theoretical model, as compared with Table 6, we consider
these results as the principal results of the paper.
Note, in closing, that Proposition 2 allows for an alternative interpretation. In the model of Johnson
et al. (2000), in times of crisis, managers face stronger incentives to expropriate from shareholders, as the
marginal product of capital declines; a similar logic can hold for governments. In a similar vein, Paltseva
(2008) argues that as capital accumulation continues, political predation becomes more attractive, as the
marginal product of investment goes down. Our second prediction, however, follows from no other model
and therefore oﬀers the stronger test of our model.11
3.6 Robustness checks
Table 9 reports the robustness of our results to changes in the cutoﬀ points of the Polity index. The results
are consistent with Table 8, and the IV coeﬃcients remain signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The coeﬃcients
are larger in columns 7-8 as compared with column 5-6, probably because the category of intermediate
regimes is itself larger, suggesting that our concerns about the varying size of the subsample were well
placed. The results in columns 1-6 remain very close to the original results in Table 6.
We conﬁrm that our results still hold when interacting the growth downturn dummy with Polity and
Polity squared. In addition, we obtained the strongest and most highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for Polity
11Note too that in our analysis, we focus only on the equilibria in which the citizens want to replace the governments
more often after bad economic outcomes. This is consistent with the literature on retrospective voting, e.g. Kiewiet and
Rivers (1984), and with the assumption of performance voting in accountability models, e.g. Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1991),
Persson and Tabellini (2000), Humpreys and Bates (2006). Relevant too is that empirical evidence suggests that citizens
may in fact punish politicians for bad luck and reward them for good. Using historical U.S. data, Achen and Bartels (2002)
ﬁnd that voters regularly punish governments for droughts, ﬂoods, and shark attacks. Wolfers (2002) ﬁnds that voters in
oil-producing states tend to re-elect incumbent governors during oil price rises and vote them out of oﬃce when the oil price
drops.
19squared in the intermediate range of the Polity index. Our results are also robust to the exclusion of
former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries.
Given the evidence contained in the literature, it is possible that intermediate regimes may diﬀer
from others not because their institutions are diﬀerent in structure but because they are younger in age
and therefore less institutionalized (Huntington 1968). To explore this possibility, we re-estimated the
estimates in Table 8 while controlling for the age of political parties, the number of years the chief executive
has remained in oﬃce, and the number of years since independence. The results remain unchanged.
It is also possible that countries with higher population density or higher fraction of urban population
are, other things being equal, more technologically advanced (Kremer 1993) and, therefore, are more
prone to economic shocks. We checked that our results are robust to inclusion of these variables.
We also ﬁnd that the results of Table 8 are robust to diﬀerent ways of clustering standard errors. The
results do not substantially change if clustering by country, year, or region-year is used.
One could argue that government spending should not be used as control as it is itsef endogenous.
Our results are robust to dropping government spending from the list of controls (see results in a working
paper version of this paper).
Finally, we ﬁnd that our results do not change if we control for foreign aid and for the fraction of
military in labor force.
4 Conclusion
Our model implies that in intermediate regimes chance events can lead to changes in expectations and thus
in the political and economic choices that people make. Both within-country and cross-country variation
will therefore be high. Our model thus points to systematic forces that can generate what previously had
appeared to be unsystematic and unpredictable behavior in such regimes.
Upon reﬂection, an additional implication ﬂows from our analysis. The argument suggests the existence
20of three kinds of countries. First come those in which γ is high. In such countries, our argument implies,
political expectations can have little eﬀect on growth. Investors are protected from government predation
by the fact that should a government predate, it would be driven from oﬃce. Expectations are therefore
already favorable.
Secondly there are countries in which γ is low. Such countries are run by dictators whom the people
cannot overthrow. In these countries expectations are bad, and governments have little incentive to modify
them because the expectations will not improve even should they choose to behave with restraint.
It is among countries in the middle range of γ where growth responds to changes in expectations.
According to our model, should a government behave opportunistically, or the country be hit with an
external shock, then the perceived level of risk will rise and the rate of growth decline. On the other hand,
in this range of γ, there are economic payoﬀs for the exercise of political restraint. Among such countries,
the behavior of governments can make a diﬀerence. They can induce economic growth. They can do so
by shaping political expectations.
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Figure 1. World Democratization Trends, 1955-2000. Reproduced from Epstein, Bates, et al. (2006) 
 
 
Figure 2. Reproduced from Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson (2001) “The Colonial Origins 
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Figure 3 Histogram of Polity variable, 1982-2003               Figure 4. Histogram of Democracy variable, 1982-2003 
(Polity=Democracy-Autocracy)                  Source: Polity IV Project 
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Figure 5. Histogram of Autocracy variable, 1982-2003      Figure 6. Histogram of Legislative Index of Electoral 
Source: Polity IV Project                 Competitiveness. Source: Beck et al. (2006) 












      
Figure 7. Variance of expropriation risk, by regime type, 1982-2003              













Figure 8. Variance of growth rate, by regime type. Source: WDI 2005, Polity IV Project, authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 9. Regression coefficients for collapse effect on risk variables as a function of political regime. Based on the 
regression from table 6. Table 1. Equilibria in a game between the government and the citizens. The results of 
Proposition 1. 
 




















Table 2. Economic shocks by region. 
 
A: Negative economic shocks, by region, 1982-2003   
World Bank  region  Number of collapses  Unconditional  
probability of  
having collapse 
Australia and Oceania  42  .286 
Center, South and East Asia  69  .145 
Eastern Europe/Former USSR  89  .211 
Latin America  184  .226 
North Africa/Middle East  115  .258 
Sub-Saharian Africa  287  .262 
Western Europe/North America  75  .140 
Total  861  .219 
Source: WDI 2005, authors’ calculations 
 
B. Average growth variables for economic shocks, by region, 1982-2003 
WB Region  Average growth before  Average growth after  Average growth change 
Australia and Oceania  4.746  -3.653  -8.399 
Center, South and East Asia  3.793  -2.308  -6.101 
Eastern Europe/Former USSR  -.962  -9.524  -8.562 
Latin America  2.797  -3.577  -6.374 
North Africa/Middle East  3.316  -4.133  -7.449 
Sub-Saharian Africa  2.169  -5.404  -7.573 
Western Europe/North America  2.970  -.4362  -3.406 
Total  2.458  -4.503  -6.962 
Source: WDI 2005, authors’ calculations 
 
 
Table 3. Natural disasters counted for disaster variable 
Disaster type  Occurrence, 1980-2003 
Earthquake  590 
Drought  496 
Extreme Temperature  223 
Flood  1978 
Slides  343 
Volcano  104 
Wave / Surge  15 
Wind Storm  1685 







Table 4. Summary statistics and sources of data 
Variable          Source  Observations  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Expropriation risk  IRIS-3  1945  2.91  2.309  0  9.5 
Risk of repudiation of 
contracts 
IRIS-3  1945  3.57  2.343  0  9.5 
Government stability  ICRG  2453  7.31  2.453  0  12 
Polity  Polity IV  3688  0.74  7.592  -10  10 
Autocracy dummy  Polity IV, 
calculations 
3230  0.35  0.478  0  1 
Intermediate regime dummy  Polity IV, 
calculations 
3230  0.28  0.450  0  1 
Democracy dummy  Polity IV, 
calculations 
3230  0.37  0.482  0  1 
Collapse dummy  WDI 2005,  
calculations 
4179  0.22  0.416  0  1 
Collapse in previous 3 years  WDI 2005 , 
calculations 
4186  0.55  0.497  0  1 
Natural disasters  EM-DAT, 
calculations 
5643  1.00  2.401  0  33 




5137  2.99  6.802  0  93 




5643  0.07  0.263  0  1 
Negative term of trade shocks 
in previous 3 years 
Rodrik (1999), 
calculations 
5137  0.25  0.572  0  3 
Log (GDP per capita)  WDI 2005  3924  8.20  1.135  5.63  11.08 
Openness  WDI 2005  3387  79.92  45.546  1.53  296.38 
Log (Population)  WDI 2005  5049  15.20  2.086  9.89  20.97 




5643  1.00  2.025  0  17.42 
Government change dummy  Leadership 
duration 
database, PITF 
4173  0.16  0.369  0  1 
Government consumption 
expenditures, % GDP 
WDI 2006  3973  16.86  7.517  1.375  76.22 
Average party age  DPI 2006  2663  31.198  28.04  1  183 
Age of regime  Databanks 
2010 
4173  7.177  8.385  0  48 
Urban population, %  WDI 2005  3560  .507  .236  .042  1 
Population density  WDI 2005  3350  141.86  449.23  1.158  6826.23 
Foreign aid, % GNI  WDI 2005  3520  8.629  13.66  -.689  242.28 
Military personnel, % labor 
force 
WDI 2005  2490  1.898  2.284  .059  29.4 
Years since independence     3467  147.38  344.8  -12  2556 
Autocracy dummy  DPI, 
calculations 
3499  .232  .422  0  1 
Intermediate regime dummy  DPI, 
calculations 
3499  .273  .445  0  1 
Democracy dummy  DPI, 
calculations 











 Table 5. Risk variables and economic shocks, FE. 
Economic shocks are instrumented by natural disasters and terms of trade shocks 










  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  OLS  OLS  IV  IV 
Economic shock in  0.0213  0.164  1.689*  1.769** 
years t, t-1, or t-2  [0.0897]  [0.100]  [0.879]  [0.792] 
Log GDP pc,  0.526  -0.0838  -0.672  -1.446* 
lagged 3 years  [0.574]  [0.715]  [0.712]  [0.814] 
Log (Population)  -3.226**  -3.713***  -3.848***  -4.487*** 
lagged 3 years  [1.466]  [1.324]  [1.009]  [1.040] 
Openness  -0.0133***  -0.0127***  -0.00998***  -0.00995*** 
lagged 3 years  [0.00353]  [0.00316]  [0.00345]  [0.00347] 
Government spending,  0.0376**  0.0235  0.0140  0.000437 
% of GDP, l. 3 years  [0.0174]  [0.0172]  [0.0210]  [0.0182] 
Expropriation risk,  0.168***    0.172***   
lagged 3 years  [0.0601]    [0.0475]   
Risk of repudiation of     0.204***    0.127** 
contracts, l. 3years    [0.0552]    [0.0624] 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1,144  1,144  1,144  1,144 
Number of countries  114  114  114  114 
Robust standard errors in brackets. 




























 Table 6. Risk variables and economic shocks, with interactions, FE 
Regimes are classified by Polity measure from Polity IV. 
Economic shocks are instrumented by natural disasters and terms of trade shocks. 










  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  OLS  OLS  IV  IV 
Shock*Autocracy  0.123  0.429**  1.462  1.419 
  [0.158]  [0.196]  [1.061]  [1.008] 
Shock*Intermediate   0.184  0.352**  2.983**  1.846* 
Regime  [0.177]  [0.176]  [1.418]  [1.020] 
Shock*Democracy  0.150  0.217*  -0.741  0.0568 
  [0.138]  [0.129]  [1.180]  [0.758] 
Autocracy  0.651***  0.330  -0.307  -0.322 
  [0.199]  [0.208]  [0.992]  [0.765] 
Intermediate Regime  0.306  0.204  -1.437*  -0.483 
  [0.200]  [0.192]  [0.756]  [0.535] 
Log GDP pc,  -0.492***  -0.716***  -0.323  -0.532 
lagged 3 years  [0.0839]  [0.0921]  [0.864]  [0.766] 
Log (Population)  -0.214***  -0.231***  -3.919***  -4.319*** 
lagged 3 years  [0.0529]  [0.0545]  [1.095]  [0.999] 
Openness  -0.00991***  -0.00821***  -0.00309  -0.00666 
lagged 3 years  [0.00204]  [0.00203]  [0.00508]  [0.00407] 
Government spending,  0.00509  0.00969  0.0424**  0.0246 
% of GDP, l. 3 years  [0.00863]  [0.00921]  [0.0184]  [0.0154] 
Expropriation Risk,  0.334***    0.120*   
lagged 3 years  [0.0419]    [0.0622]   
Risk of repudiation of     0.366***    0.142*** 
contracts, l. 3years    [0.0382]    [0.0509] 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1,086  1,086  1,086  1,086 
Number of countries  109  109  109  109 
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 



















 Table 7. Risk variables and economic shocks, with interactions, FE 
Regimes are classified by Legislative Electoral Competitiveness Index from World Bank 
Database of Political Institutions of Beck et al. (2006) 
Economic shocks are instrumented by natural disasters and terms of trade shocks. 










  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  OLS  OLS  IV  IV 
Shock*Autocracy  0.198  0.332*  0.189  0.836 
  [0.190]  [0.197]  [1.690]  [1.044] 
Shock*Intermediate   0.102  0.260*  3.990**  3.700** 
Regime  [0.164]  [0.139]  [1.719]  [1.524] 
Shock*Democracy  0.124  0.294**  -3.882  0.211 
  [0.113]  [0.120]  [3.367]  [1.953] 
Autocracy  0.587***  0.443*  -0.629  0.276 
  [0.190]  [0.227]  [1.056]  [0.691] 
Intermediate Regime  0.396**  0.292*  -3.508*  -1.779 
  [0.185]  [0.163]  [1.839]  [1.316] 
Log GDP pc,  -0.440***  -0.723***  1.527  -1.186 
lagged 3 years  [0.0821]  [0.0995]  [1.819]  [1.165] 
Log (Population)  -0.187***  -0.204***  -4.792***  -5.360*** 
lagged 3 years  [0.0471]  [0.0539]  [1.708]  [1.249] 
Openness  -0.00817***  -0.00803***  -0.0164**  -0.0108** 
lagged 3 years  [0.00185]  [0.00185]  [0.00786]  [0.00531] 
Government spending,  -0.00864  0.00654  0.0431*  0.0310* 
% of GDP, l. 3 years  [0.00790]  [0.00863]  [0.0241]  [0.0179] 
Expropriation Risk,  0.369***    0.0169   
lagged 3 years  [0.0369]    [0.0885]   
Risk of repudiation of     0.365***    0.0516 
contracts, l. 3years    [0.0381]    [0.0745] 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1,129  1,129  1,129  1,129 
Number of countries  111  111  111  111 
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 


















 Table 8. Risk variables and economic shocks, with interactions, FE. Only periods with no 
changes of government are included. 
Economic shocks are instrumented by natural disasters and terms of trade shocks 










  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  OLS  OLS  IV  IV 
Shock*Autocracy  0.0518  0.307  1.214  1.111 
  [0.154]  [0.264]  [1.023]  [0.946] 
Shock*Intermediate   0.282  0.215  3.095***  2.575*** 
Regime  [0.202]  [0.213]  [1.002]  [0.859] 
Shock*Democracy  0.252  0.222  6.181  4.394 
  [0.224]  [0.169]  [4.613]  [3.895] 
Autocracy  0.166  -0.0198  3.392  2.144 
  [0.480]  [0.461]  [2.617]  [2.216] 
Intermediate Regime  -0.477  -0.0862  1.348  0.970 
  [0.394]  [0.356]  [2.340]  [1.966] 
Log GDP pc,  0.433  0.401  -2.446  -1.907 
lagged 3 years  [0.712]  [0.840]  [1.638]  [1.512] 
Log (Population)  -1.803  -3.056  -4.183  -5.428** 
lagged 3 years  [1.775]  [1.843]  [2.820]  [2.380] 
Openness  -0.0105**  -0.0120***  0.00275  -0.00373 
lagged 3 years  [0.00474]  [0.00456]  [0.00760]  [0.00594] 
Government spending,  0.0541**  0.0269  0.0208  0.00967 
% of GDP, l. 3 years  [0.0233]  [0.0217]  [0.0346]  [0.0279] 
Expropriation Risk,  0.202**    0.373**   
lagged 3 years  [0.0826]    [0.150]   
Risk of repudiation of     0.258***    0.238** 
contracts, l. 3years    [0.0855]    [0.0960] 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  629  629  629  629 
Number of countries  101  101  101  101 
Robust standard errors in brackets.  



















Table 9. Risk variables and economic shocks, with interactions, FE. Different endpoints (robustness check). Only periods with no changes of 
government are included. Economic shocks are instrumented by natural disasters and terms of trade shocks 




















  Polity endpoints -7 and 6  Polity endpoints are -7 and 8  Polity endpoints are -6 and 7  Polity endpoints are -8 and 7 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Shock*Autocracy  1.424  1.061  1.832*  1.485  1.947**  1.747**  -0.693  -2.013 
  [1.000]  [1.047]  [1.027]  [0.952]  [0.961]  [0.860]  [1.013]  [1.243] 
Shock*Intermediate   3.172***  2.963***  3.120***  2.922***  2.461**  1.801**  4.700**  5.011** 
Regime  [1.068]  [0.916]  [1.087]  [0.950]  [1.020]  [0.862]  [2.290]  [2.313] 
Shock*Democracy  4.490*  1.987  4.671  1.120  6.470  4.308  6.998  5.997 
  [2.409]  [1.997]  [5.506]  [3.568]  [4.705]  [3.739]  [5.401]  [5.447] 
Autocracy  2.546**  0.991  2.598  0.837  2.844  1.660  6.269*  7.183* 
  [1.220]  [1.096]  [2.333]  [1.438]  [2.561]  [2.010]  [3.624]  [3.738] 
Intermediate Regime  0.665  -0.286  1.003  -0.153  1.678  1.134  1.832  1.291 
  [1.106]  [0.973]  [2.476]  [1.703]  [2.419]  [1.933]  [2.856]  [2.822] 
Log GDP pc,  -1.992*  -1.382  -1.857  -1.345  -2.378  -1.745  -3.497  -3.617 
lagged 3 years  [1.061]  [1.047]  [1.200]  [1.080]  [1.651]  [1.456]  [2.363]  [2.490] 
Log (Population)  -4.439*  -5.291***  -3.559  -5.866***  -3.690  -4.641**  -6.083  -7.900** 
lagged 3 years  [2.299]  [1.862]  [2.839]  [1.967]  [2.937]  [2.341]  [3.836]  [3.837] 
Openness  0.00314  -0.00533  0.00330  -0.00496  0.00311  -0.00356  0.00826  0.00472 
lagged 3 years  [0.00632]  [0.00532]  [0.00850]  [0.00585]  [0.00747]  [0.00553]  [0.0110]  [0.0102] 
Government spending,  0.0227  0.0146  0.0274  0.0104  0.0162  0.00597  0.0244  0.0181 
% of GDP, l. 3 years  [0.0295]  [0.0228]  [0.0283]  [0.0240]  [0.0360]  [0.0275]  [0.0422]  [0.0397] 
Expropriation Risk,  0.333***    0.356*    0.359**    0.407**   
lagged 3 years  [0.100]    [0.198]    [0.148]    [0.177]   
Risk of repudiation of     0.223***    0.193**    0.239***    0.316** 
contracts, l. 3years    [0.0771]    [0.0822]    [0.0887]    [0.122] 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  629  629  629  629  629  629  629  629 
Number of countries  101  101  101  101  101  101  101  101 
Robust standard errors in brackets. All specifications are IV estimates of equation (2). 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% APPENDIX (This appendix might be web-based or dropped altogether with a reference to a working paper
version of this paper!)
Proof. [Lemma 1] Consider a subgame at t =2if a new government comes to power. For any government from the
pool of possible governments, the prior probability that a government has high competence is µ.A sw ea r el o o k i n g
for the equilibrium in pure strategies, the government’s strategy Pr(x|θ,t = 2) can be written as xθ2 ∈ {0,1},
where θ is the type of the government.
The outcome y =1is possible if: (1) competence θ = θH,a n dp r e d a t i o nx =1 ,( 2 )c o m p e t e n c eθ = θH,a n d
predation x =0 ,( 3 )c o m p e t e n c eθ = θL,a n dp r e d a t i o nx =0 . The outcome y =0is possible in the following
cases: (1) competence θ = θH,a n dp r e d a t i o nx =1 ,( 2 )c o m p e t e n c eθ = θL,a n dp r e d a t i o nx =0 ,( 3 )c o m p e t e n c e
θ = θL,a n dp r e d a t i o nx =1 .P r o b a b i l i t i e so ft h e s eo u t c o m e sd e p e n do np e o p l e ’ sp r i o rb e l i e f sa b o u tt h et y p e so fa
government and on the government’s strategy. People’s posterior beliefs about the government’s competence are







Now consider four possible pure strategy proﬁles of a government at t =2 : xH2 =1 ,x L2 =1 ; xH2 =1 ,x L2 =0 ;
xH2 =0 ,x L2 =1 ; xH2 =0 ,x L2 =0 . The rest of the proof is organized as follows. First, for each strategy of a
government, we ﬁnd people’s best response to this strategy. Second, we check if the original strategy proﬁle of a
government is still a best response to people’s strategy, i.e. if a proposed pair of strategies constitute an equilibrium
in this game.
Note that everywhere it is optimal for people to change the government if their posterior that the government
has high competence is lower than µ∗(γ)=µ −
c(γ)
γδpH[f(1)−f(0)].S i m i l a r l y ,i ti so p t i m a lt ok e e pt h eg o v e r n m e n ti f
people’s posterior that the government has high competence is higher than µ∗(γ). Indeed, as in the third period
when every type of government will predate the citizens compare δ (￿ µ2(pHf(1) + (1 − pH)f(0)) + (1 − ￿ µ2)f(0)) and
−c(γ)+δ (γ[µ(pHf(1) + (1 − pH)f(0)) + (1 − µ)f(0)] + (1 − γ)[￿ µ2(pHf(1) + (1 − pH)f(0)) + (1 − ￿ µ2)f(0)]). It is
optimal for the people to overthrow the current government if (￿ µ2 − µ)(pHf(1) − pHf(0)) < −
c(γ)
γδ .
For a new government in the second period:(1) Assume that xH2 =1 ,x L2 =1 .P e o p l e ’ s p o s t e r i o r s a b o u t t h e g o v e r n m e n t ’ s c o m p e t e n c e a r e ￿ µ2|y=1 =
µ∗pH












1−µpH [f(1) − f(0)]). Therefore, the optimal response of people to the assumed government’s strategy is
s2|1=not overthrow, s2|0=overthrow.
The payoﬀso fd i ﬀerent types of the government given the people’s strategy are following. For θ = θH,t h ep a y o ﬀ
from predation is U(θH|x = 1) = B+R+δ (pH(B + R)+( 1− pH)(1 − γ)(B + R)),a n dt h ep a y o ﬀ from restraint is
U(θH|x = 0) = B+δ(B+R).S o ,f o rah i g h - c o m p e t e n tg o v e r n m e n t ,p r e d a t i o ni sp r o ﬁ t a b l ei fR>δγ(1−pH)(B+R).
Similarly, for θ = θL,t h ep a y o ﬀ from predation is U(θL|x = 1) = B + R + δ(1 − γ)(B + R),a n dt h ep a y o ﬀ from
restraint is U(θL|x = 0) = B + δ(pL(B + R)+( 1− pL)(1 − γ)(B + R)). Therefore, a low-competent government
predates if R>δγpL(B + R). For 1 − pH >p L,s t r a t e g yp r o ﬁ l e sxH2 =1 ,x L2 =1 , and s2|1=not overthrow,
s2|0=overthrow constitute equilibrium if R>δγ(1 − pH)(B + R).














<µ .W e u s e d t h e f a c t t h a t pL <p H by the assumption. Therefore, the
optimal response of people to the assumed government’s strategy is s2|1=not overthrow and s2|0=overthrow
if ￿ µ2|y=0 <µ ∗(γ), s2|0=not overthrow if ￿ µ2|y=0 >µ ∗(γ).A s f o r t h e p e o p l e ’ s s t r a t e g y s2|1=not overthrow
and s2|0=not overthrow the optimal response for both types of government is to predate, s2|1=not overthrow
and s2|0=not overthrow is not an equilibrium strategy. The strategy s2|1=not overthrow, s2|0=overthrow is













· [f(1) − f(0)]).
For a high-competent government, predation is proﬁtable if R>δγ(1−pH)(B+R). Similarly, a low-competent
government predates if R>δγpL(B + R). As 1 − pH >p L,s t r a t e g yxL2 =0is not optimal for a low-type
government, and for any parameter values xH2 =1 ,x L2 =0is not the part of an equilibrium.
(3) Assume that xH2 =0 ,x L2 =1 . Then ￿ µ2|y=1 =1>µ ∗(γ), ￿ µ2|y=0 =0<µ ∗(γ). Therefore, the optimal
response of people to the assumed government’s strategy is s2|1=not overthrow, s2|0=overthrow.A sb e f o r e ,f o r
ah i g h - c o m p e t e n tg o v e r n m e n t ,p r e d a t i o ni sp r o ﬁ t a b l ei fR>γδ(1 − pH)(B + R).S i m i l a r l y ,f o rθ = θL,p r e d a t i o n
is optimal if R>δγpL(B + R). As a result, strategy proﬁles xH2 =0 ,x L2 =1 , and s2|1=not overthrow,
s2|0=overthrow constitute equilibrium if γδpL(B + R) <R<γδ(1 − pH)(B + R).
(4) Assume that xH2 =0 ,x L2 =0 . Then ￿ µ2|y=1 =
µ
µ+(1−µ)∗pL >µ>µ ∗(γ) , ￿ µ2|y=0 =0<µ ∗(γ).A sar e s u l t ,
the strategy proﬁles xH2 =0 ,x L2 =0 , and s2|1=not overthrow, s2|0=overthrow constitute an equilibrium if
γδpL(B + R) >R .For an old government, after the ﬁrst period, the people’s posterior beliefs that the government has high
competence depend on the government strategy in the ﬁrst period. Similar to the case of a new government in the







• For xH1 =1 , xL1 =1 ,t h e s eb e l i e f sa r e￿ µ1|y1=1 =1>µ ∗(γ) and ￿ µ1|y1=0 =
µ∗(1−pH)
µ∗(1−pH)+(1−µ) <µ ∗(γ).















• For xH1 =0 , xL1 =1 ,t h e s eb e l i e f sa r e￿ µ1|y1=1 =1>µ ∗(γ) and ￿ µ1|y1=0 =0<µ ∗(γ).
• For xH1 =0 , xL1 =0 ,t h e s eb e l i e f sa r e￿ µ1|y1=1 =
µ
µ+(1−µ)∗pL >µ>µ ∗(γ) ,a n d￿ µ1|y1=0 =0<µ ∗(γ).
Now, we look separately at the cases of y =0and y =1and check which equilibria might be supported for diﬀerent
strategies of the government in the ﬁrst period. Denote ￿ µ2|y2=i(a,b) as the posterior belief of the citizens that the
government is high-competent after y2 = i if the government’s strategy is xH2 = a and xL2 = b.
1. Assume that y =0 , xH1 =1 ,a n dxL1 =1 .H e r e ￿ µ1|y1=0 =
µ∗(1−pH)
1−µpH <µ ∗(γ).E q u i l i b r i a i n a c o n -
tinuation game are as described above because ￿ µ2|y2=1(1,1) = 1 >µ ∗(γ) and ￿ µ2|y2=0(1,1) =
￿ µ1∗(1−pH)
−￿ µ1pH+1 <

















< ￿ µ1|y1=0 <µ(but xH2 =1 , xL2 =0do not constitute an equilibrium in a continuation
game); ￿ µ2|y2=1(0,1) = 1 >µ ∗(γ) and ￿ µ2|y2=0(0,1) = 0 <µ ∗(γ); ￿ µ2|y2=1(0,0) =
￿ µ1
￿ µ1+(1−￿ µ1)∗pL >µ>µ ∗(γ)
and ￿ µ2|y2=0 =0<µ ∗(γ).





<µ .Equilibria in a continuation





















￿ µ1|y1=0 <µ(but xH2 =1 , xL2 =0do not constitute an equilibrium in a continuation game); ￿ µ2|y2=1(0,1) =
1 >µ ∗(γ) and ￿ µ2|y2=0(0,1) = 0 <µ ∗(γ); ￿ µ2|y2=1(0,0) =
￿ µ1






￿ µ2|y2=0(0,0) = 0 <µ ∗(γ) .3. Assume that y =0 , xH1 =0 ,a n dxL1 =1 .H e r e￿ µ1|y1=0 =0<µ ∗(γ).F o ra n ys t r a t e g yo ft h eg o v e r n m e n t
in the second period, posterior beliefs about the government’s competence are ￿ µ2|y2=1 =0and ￿ µ2|y2=0 =0 .
Therefore, the optimal strategy for people is s2|1=s2|0=overthrow,a n dxH2 =1 ,a n dxL2 =1is the
government’s optimal response to that. So, the strategies s2|1=s2|0=overthrow, xH2 =1 ,a n dxL2 =1
constitute equilibrium in this continuation game, which is not a part of the described equilibrium.
4. Assume that y =0 , xH1 =0 ,a n dxL1 =0 .H e r e￿ µ1|y1=0 =0<µ ∗(γ).F o ra n ys t r a t e g yo ft h eg o v e r n m e n t
in the second period, posterior beliefs about the government’s competence are ￿ µ2|y2=1 =0and ￿ µ2|y2=0 =0 .
Therefore, the optimal strategy for people is s2|1=s2|0=overthrow,a n dxH2 =1 ,a n dxL2 =1is the
government’s optimal response to that. So, the strategies s2|1=s2|0=overthrow, xH2 =1 ,a n dxL2 =1
constitute equilibrium in this continuation game, which is not a part of the described equilibrium.
5. Assume that y =1 , xH1 =1 ,a n dxL1 =1 .H e r e￿ µ1|y1=1 =1>µ ∗(γ).F o ra n ys t r a t e g yo ft h eg o v e r n m e n t
in the second period, posterior beliefs about the government’s competence are ￿ µ2|y2=1 =1and ￿ µ2|y2=0 =1 .
Therefore, the optimal strategy for people is s2|1=s2|0=not overthrow,a n dxH2 =1 ,a n dxL2 =1is
the government’s optimal response to that. So, the strategies s2|1=s2|0=not overthrow, xH2 =1 ,a n d
xL2 =1constitute equilibrium in this continuation game, which is not a part of the described equilibrium.





>µ>µ ∗(γ).E q u i l i b r i a







































>µ>µ ∗(γ) (but xH2 =1 , xL2 =0do not constitute an equilibrium in a
continuation game); ￿ µ2|y2=1(0,1) = 1 >µ ∗(γ) and ￿ µ2|y2=0(0,1) = 0 <µ ∗(γ); ￿ µ2|y2=1(0,0) =
￿ µ1
￿ µ1+(1−￿ µ1)∗pL >
￿ µ1 >µ ∗(γ) and ￿ µ2|y2=0(0,0) = 0 <µ ∗(γ).
7. Assume that y =1 , xH1 =0 ,a n dxL1 =1 .H e r e￿ µ1|y1=1 =1>µ ∗(γ).F o ra n ys t r a t e g yo ft h eg o v e r n m e n t
in the second period, posterior beliefs about the government’s competence are ￿ µ2|y2=1 =1and ￿ µ2|y2=0 =1 .
Therefore, the optimal strategy for people is s2|1=s2|0=not overthrow,a n dxH2 =1 ,a n dxL2 =1is
the government’s optimal response to that. So, the strategies s2|1=s2|0=not overthrow, xH2 =1 ,a n d
xL2 =1constitute equilibrium in this continuation game, which is not a part of the described equilibrium.8. Assume that y =1 , xH1 =0 ,a n dxL1 =0 .H e r e ￿ µ1|y1=1 =
µ
µ+(1−µ)∗pL >µ>µ ∗(γ). If xH2 =1and







>µ>µ ∗(γ). Then strategies
xH2 =1 ,a n dxL2 =1 ,a n ds2|1=s2|0=not overthrow constitute an equilibrium in a continuation
















xH2 =1 , xL2 =0do not constitute an equilibrium in a continuation game); ￿ µ2|y2=1(0,1) = 1 >µ ∗(γ) and
￿ µ2|y2=0(0,1) = 0 <µ ∗(γ); ￿ µ2|y2=1(0,0) =
￿ µ1
￿ µ1+(1−￿ µ1)∗pL > ￿ µ1|y1=1 >µ ∗(γ) and ￿ µ2|y2=0(0,0) = 0 <µ ∗(γ).
Proof. [Proposition 1] We consider the case of the following equilibrium in a continuation game: for any y and
any government’s strategy in the ﬁrst period, citizens play s2|1=not overthrow, s2|0=overthrow in the second
period. Equilibrium strategies of the government in the second period are computed conditional on γ. In the
parameter region in which the solution of a continuation game is given by (1)-(3) of Lemma 1, the continuation
payoﬀso ft h eg o v e r n m e n ta f t e rt h eﬁ r s tp e r i o dd e p e n do ni t st y p ea n dt h ev a l u eo fγ.
In particular, continuation payoﬀs, denoted by VH and VL, are the following:
VH =

   
   
B + R + δ (pH +( 1− pH)(1 − γ))[B + R] if R>γδ(1 − pH)(B + R)
B + δ [B + R] if γδpL(B + R) <R<γδ(1 − pH)(B + R)
B + δ [B + R] if R<γδpL(B + R)
VL =

   
   
B + R + δ (1 − γ)[B + R] if R>γδ(1 − pH)(B + R)
B + R + δ (1 − γ)[B + R] if γδpL(B + R) <R<γδ(1 − pH)(B + R)
B + δ (pL +( 1− pL)(1 − γ))[B + R] if R<γδpL(B + R)
We are looking for Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. To ﬁnd all pure strategy equilibrium, the strategy of each
type of the government should be a best response to the strategy of the other type of government given beliefs. If
the costs of overthrowing the government are small enough then the citizens will play s1|1=not overthrow, s1|0=
overthrow. It is optimal for the people to overthrow the current government if γδ(￿ µ1 − µ)(U2|θ=θH − U2|θ=θL) <
−c(γ), where U2|θ=θi is the expected payoﬀ of the citizens in the subsequent periods if the government’s type
in the beginning of the second period is θi (these expected payoﬀsd e p e n do nγ,b e c a u s ef o rd i ﬀerent values of γ
governments play diﬀerent strategies in the second period). As a competent government in the second period cannot
predate when an incompetent one does not, U2|θ=θH −U2|θ=θL > 0 for any γ. Therefore, if c(γ)i ss u ﬃciently small
then for all strategy proﬁles except xH1 =1 , xL1 =0 , s1|1=not overthrow, s1|0=overthrow is a best responseas a positive outcome increases the ex-post probability of a high-competent government, while a negative outcome
decreases this probability: ￿ µ1|y1=1 >µ ∗∗(γ) and ￿ µ1|y1=0 <µ ∗∗(γ), where µ∗∗(γ)=µ−
c(γ)
γδ[U|θ=θH−U2|θ=θL].P a y o ﬀs
of the government are the following:
UH(xH1 =1 ,x L1 = 1) = B + R + δ(pH +( 1− pH)(1 − γ))VH
UL(xH1 =1 ,x L1 = 1) = B + R + δ (1 − γ)VL
UH(xH1 =1 ,x L1 = 0) = B + R + δ(pH +( 1− pH)(1 − γ))VH
UL(xH1 =1 ,x L1 = 0) = B + δ(pL +( 1− pL)(1 − γ))VL
UH(xH1 =0 ,x L1 = 1) = B + δVH
UL(xH1 =0 ,x L1 = 1) = B + R + δ (1 − γ)VL
UH(xH1 =0 ,x L1 = 0) = B + δVH
UL(xH1 =0 ,x L1 = 0) = B + δ(pL +( 1− pL)(1 − γ))VL
Note that for both types of the government either xi1 =1or xi1 =0is a dominant strategy, i.e. if xi1 =1
is a best response to x−i,1 =0 ,i ti sa l s oab e s tr e s p o n s et ox−i,1 =1 .S o , i n o r d e r t o ﬁ n d a P e r f e c t B a y e s i a n
equilibrium, we just need to ﬁnd out the conditions for dominance of xi1 =1for both i ∈ {H,L}.
The optimal strategy of a competent government is xH1 =1if
B + R + δ (1 + pHγ − γ)VH >B+ δVH
i.e. if R>δ(1 − pH)γVH.F o rR>γδ(1 − pH)(B + R), this condition can be rewritten as R>δ(1 − pH)γ(B +
R)(1 + δ + δpHγ − δγ) and it is equivalent to




We consider two cases: R is small and R is large. If R is large, and, in particular, (1 + δ)2 − 4R
B+R < 0,t h e n
the discriminant in (4) is negative, and for any γ such that γ < R
δ(1−pH)(B+R) the condition (4) is satisﬁed, and,
therefore, xH1 =1is a dominant strategy. If R is small, and, in particular, R
B+R < δ,t h i si m p l i e st h a tf o r
γ = R








(B+R)2 < 0. The derivative
of the left-hand side of (4) at this point is
2Rδ(1−pH)
(B+R) − δ(1 − pH)(1 + δ) which is less than 0, as R
B+R < δ implies
2R
B+R < 1+δ. This implies that the intersection of γ < R
δ(1−pH)(B+R) and (4) is [0,γ1] where γ1 is a smaller solution
of γ2δ2(1 − pH)2 − γδ(1 − pH)(1 + δ)+ R
B+R =0 .
Now, consider the case γ > R
δ(1−pH)(B+R). The optimal strategy of a competent government is xH1 =1if
R>δ(1 − pH)γ(B + δ(B + R)),o r ,e q u i v a l e n t l y ,i fγ < R
δ(1−pH)(B+δ(B+R)). If R is large, and R>δ(B + R),t h i simplies that R
δ(1−pH)(B+δ(B+R)) > R
δ(1−pH)(B+R),a n dxH1 =1is optimal for γ < R
δ(1−pH)(B+δ(B+R)).A sar e s u l t ,i f
R is large, xH1 =1is optimal if γ < R
δ(1−pH)(B+δ(B+R)),i . e .i fγ is suﬃciently small. If R is small, this implies that
γ < R
δ(1−pH)(B+δ(B+R)) and γ > R
δ(1−pH)(B+R) is not a compatible system of inequalities. Overall, if R is small,
xH1 =1is optimal if γ < γ1.
The optimal strategy of an incompetent government is xL1 =1if
B + R + δ (1 − γ)VL >B+ δ(pL +( 1− pL)(1 − γ))VL
i.e. if R>δpLγVL.F o rR>γδpL(B+R), this condition can be rewritten as R>δpLγ (B + R + δ (1 − γ)[B + R])
which is equivalent to




As before, we consider two cases: R is small and R is large. If R is large, and, in particular, (1+δ)2− 4R
pL(B+R) < 0,
the proof is similar to the previous case. For any γ such that γ < R
δpL(B+R),c o n d i t i o n( 5 )i ss a t i s ﬁ e d ,a n d ,t h e r e f o r e ,
xL1 =1is a dominant strategy. If R is small, and, in particular, R
B+R < δpL,t h i si m p l i e st h a tf o rγ = R
δpL(B+R),t h e








(B+R)2 < 0. This implies that the intersection
of γ < R
δpL(B+R) and (5) is [0,γ2] where γ2 is a smaller solution of γ2δ2pL − γδpL(1 + δ)+ R
B+R =0 .
Now, consider the case γ > R
δpL(B+R). The optimal strategy of an incompetent government is xL1 =1if
R>δpLγ(B + δ (pL +( 1− pL)(1 − γ))[B + R]),o r ,e q u i v a l e n t l y ,i f
γ2δ2pL(1 − pL)(B + R) − γδpL (B + δ(B + R)) + R>0. (6)
If R is large, this implies that the discriminant δ2
￿
p2
L (B + δ(B + R))
2 − 4RpL(1 − pL)(B + R)
￿
is less than 0
(if pL < 4









,t h e nt h el e f t - h a n ds i d eo f( 6 )i sn e g a t i v ef o rb o t hγ = R
δpL(B+R) and γ =1 .A sar e s u l t ,
if R is small, there is no γ such that (6) is satisﬁed and γ > R
δpL(B+R).O v e r a l l ,i fR is large, xL1 =1is always
optimal. If R is small, xL1 =1is optimal if γ < γ2.
As a result, possible equilibria in the ﬁrst stage are the following. If R is large, the equilibrium set of strategies
is xL1 =1 , xH1 =1 ,s 1|1=not overthrow, s1|0=overthrow if γ is relatively small (i.e. γ < R
δ(1−pH)(B+δ(B+R)));
xL1 =1 , xH1 =0 ,s 1|1=not overthrow, s1|0=overthrow if γ is relatively large (i.e. γ > R
δ(1−pH)(B+δ(B+R))). If
R is small, the equilibrium set of strategies is xL1 =1 , xH1 =1 ,s 1|1=not overthrow, s1|0=overthrow if γ is
suﬃciently small (i.e. γ < γ1), xL1 =1 , xH1 =0 ,s 1|1=not overthrow, s1|0=overthrow if γ is in intermediaterange (γ ∈ [γ1,γ2]), and xL1 =0 , xH1 =0 ,s 1|1=not overthrow, s1|0=overthrow if γ is suﬃciently large (i.e.
γ > γ2).
Equilibria in continuation games are described above in lemma 1.
Proof. [Proposition 2] From the proof of lemma 1, ￿ µ1|y1=0,xH1=1,xL1=1 =
µ∗(1−pH)
1−µpH <µ , ￿ µ1|y1=0,xH1=0,xL1=1 =0<
µ,a n d￿ µ1|y1=0,xH1=0,xL1=0 =0<µ . In any case, the risk of predation goes up, as a low-competent government
predate more often.
Proof. [Proposition 3] We can compute the risk of predation in the second period as Prob(predation|µ = 0) ∗
Prob(µ = 0) + Prob(predation|µ = 1) ∗ Prob(µ = 1). The estimated risk of predation (the risk of predation,
estimated by people) is Prob(predation|µ = 0)∗ ￿ Prob(µ = 0)+Prob(predation|µ = 1)∗ ￿ Prob(µ = 1). If γ is large or
γ is small, Prob(predation|µ = 0) = Prob(predation|µ = 1),a n dt h ec h a n g ei nt h er i s ko fp r e d a t i o ni sg e n e r a t e db y
the change in ￿ Prob(µ = 1) and, correspondingly, ￿ Prob(µ = 0). In the intermediate range of γ, Prob(predation|µ =
1) <Pr o b (predation|µ = 0),s ot h ec h a n g ei nt h er i s ko fp r e d a t i o ni sh i g h e re v e ni fµ − ￿ Prob(µ = 1) remains the
same.
Now what we need is to compare µ − ￿ Prob(µ = 1) in all three types of regimes, i.e., as the proof of lemma 1
suggests, to compare µ −
µ∗(1−pH)
1−µpH , µ,a n dµ.S o ,i na d d i t i o nt oProb(predation|µ = 1) <Pr o b (predation|µ = 0),
the increase in the estimated risk of predation is the not smaller in the intermediate regimes as compared with
other regimes.12
12Note that if we assume that some governments are impatient with some small probability, i.e. they do not care about the future
periods, then this increase is strictly larger in intermediate regimes than in other types of regimes. We do not use this assumption in
the present version of the paper to save space.